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We model unemployment allowing workers to differ by comparative advantage in market work. Workers
with comparative advantage are identified by who works more hours when employed. This enables
us to test the model by grouping workers based on their long-term wages and hours from panel data.
The model captures the greater cyclicality of employment for workers with low comparative advantage.
But the model fails to explain the magnitude of countercyclical separations for high-wage workers
or the magnitude of procyclical findings for high-hours workers. As a result, it only captures the cyclicality


















Are cyclical ￿ uctuations consistent with the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) model of
unemployment? Shimer (2005), Hall (2005a), Costain and Reiter (2003), and Gertler and Tri-
gari (2009) all argue that search and matching models with ￿ exible wages cannot generate the
magnitude of cyclical ￿ uctuations in unemployment. By contrast, Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2008) rationalize this same cyclical volatility. Hagedorn and Manovskii di⁄er in that they allow
for little rents from employment: Workers receive a ￿ ow output from unemployment, re￿ ecting
the values of insurance, leisure and home production, that is the equivalent of about 95% of
their earnings when employed, whereas in Shimer and Gertler and Trigari it is 40%, and in Hall
and Costain and Reiter about 70%. As discussed by Costain and Reiter, Mortensen and Nagy-
pal (2007), and others, if working yields a low ￿ ow of rents, then small shocks to the value of
employment translate into large percentage shocks to the rents from employment that can yield
large ￿ uctuations in vacancies and unemployment. Thus establishing the rents from employ-
ment is key to judging how well the DMP model captures cyclical ￿ uctuations. These papers
each treat workers as homogeneous￿ for example, Shimer assumes a 40% replacement rate for
all workers. But given workers di⁄er markedly in both their hours and earnings when working,
we expect them to di⁄er markedly in their rents from employment. Shimer￿ s calibration of high
employment rents presumably makes sense for workers with high hours and earnings, those with
high comparative advantage in market work, whereas the Hagedorn and Manovskii calibration
may well apply for those workers with lower hours and earnings. The question is whether there
are enough workers that display low employment rents, with enough impact on aggregate labor
statistics, to generate realistic business cycle ￿ uctuations under ￿ exible wages.
We model unemployment, with endogenous job separations and vacancies, recognizing that
workers di⁄er in their comparative advantage in market work. To capture the level and dis-
persion in employment rents across workers we let workers di⁄er in market human capital and
in the value of their non-market time. We introduce enough dispersion in workers￿market
human capital to capture the di⁄erences we see in the data in workers￿long-term wage rates.
Similarly, we introduce enough dispersion in workers￿values of non-market time to capture the
di⁄erences we see in their long-term hours worked conditional on being employed. To achieve
this latter mapping to data, we introduce an intensive margin for labor supply. Workers with a
high value of market human capital to non-market predictably work more hours. This identi￿es
these workers as those with high comparative advantage in the workforce￿ that is, high rents
1from employment.1 Rates of separation and job ￿nding are closely related to this compara-
tive advantage. As in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), we allow for shocks to the quality of
employer/employee matches. A negative shock to match quality can generate an endogenous
separation to unemployment. Our model predicts much higher separation rates for workers with
low comparative advantage in the market. The model also predicts lower rents for employers
matched to workers with low comparative advantage. For this reason, it predicts lower rates of
vacancy posting and greater unemployment durations for these workers.
The paper proceeds as follows. We present the model of hours worked, separations, and
vacancy creation in Section 2. In Section 3 we calibrate the model to the dispersion in wage
rates and hours worked for employed men observed in panel data from twenty years of the
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). More exactly, we allow for four distinct
groups of workers based on workers￿long-term wage rates and hours worked: (1) those with high
wages and hours￿ ones with strong market comparative advantage, (2) those with low wages and
low hours￿ ones with a comparative disadvantage in the market, (3) those with high wages,
but low hours, and (4) those with low wages, but high hours. We let the data (SIPP) dictate
the size of each group. Although the model is calibrated parsimoniously, it reasonably matches
unemployment rates across the groups. In particular, it predicts that workers with below average
wages and hours will exhibit nearly ￿ve times the unemployment rate of workers with above
average wages and hours. This is close to the ratio of four we see in the SIPP data. The model
predicts, consistent with the data, separation and unemployment rates for the remaining groups,
those with low-wage and high-hours or high-wage and low-hours, that are intermediate to these
extreme groups.
In Section 4 we examine the model￿ s cyclical predictions for our four labor-market groups,
comparing these to patterns observed across workers in the SIPP data. We focus on whether the
model mimics the relative cyclicality of employment across the four groups and whether it can
capture the high cyclicality of employment relative to the intensive hours margin. The model
predicts, consistent with the data, that workers with low wages and low hours will exhibit much
more cyclical employment. In particular, it predicts a big shift in separations during recessions
toward low-hours workers, which we do see in the SIPP. More generally, the model matches the
data well for low-wage, low-hours workers. But the model fails in two important respects. It fails
1Our setting shares features with Rogerson and Wallenius (2008), who allow both an extensive and intensive
margins in modeling the response of total labor hours to tax changes. They model those workers at the beginning
or end of the working life cycle as those with low market comparative advantage.
2to capture the extent of (counter)cyclicality of separations for high-wage workers. At the same
time, it fails to capture the extent of cyclicality of the ￿nding rate for high-hours workers. For
these reasons, it only captures the cyclicality of employment for workers with both low wages
and low hours, while failing to capture that cyclicality for workers with stronger comparative
advantage in the market.
2. Model
We model unemployment determination with endogenous separations and vacancy creation, as
in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), while allowing for heterogeneity in workers￿market skills
and values of non-market time (di⁄erences in labor supply). We further depart by allowing for
an intensive margin of labor supply, which we exploit for matching heterogeneity in labor supply
from the model to what we see in the SIPP data.
2.1. Environment













cmt and cnt are respectively consumption of a traded, market-produced good and a non-traded,
home-produced good. We introduce consumption of the non-traded home produced goods in
order to incorporate labor supply heterogeneity into the model. We follow Mortensen and Pis-
sarides, and the rest of the literature cited above, by assuming linear utility from consumption.2
The time discount factor is denoted by ￿. We assume that the market equates ( 1
1+r), where r
is the rate of return on consumption loans, to this discount factor; so consumers are indi⁄erent
to consuming or saving their wage earnings.
Workers di⁄er in terms of working ability in the market and productivity at home activities.
We denote market ability by a. A worker￿ s productivity at home is given by ab. So relative
productivity at home, that is relative to market productivity, is b. A worker with a low value
for b will have comparative advantage in the market (i.e., high rents to market work.) The
cross-sectional distribution of workers in the economy is denoted by ￿(a;b). In calibrating we
2A number of papers have allowed for diminishing returns to consumption in search and matching models of
unemployment. (Recent examples include Bils, Chang, and Kim, 2008, Krusell, Mukuyama, and Sahin, 2008,
Nakajima, 2007, and Shao and Silos, 2007.) Based on that work, we anticipate that the qualitative conclusions
drawn here would survive allowing reasonable diminishing marginal returns to consumption.
3consider two values for a and two values for b. In the introduction we referred to high versus
low-wage workers and high versus low-hours workers. The model will map high-wage workers
to high values of a and high-hours workers to low values for b. The correlation between a and b
will re￿ ect the cross-sectional distribution of wages and hours in the SIPP data.
Turning to the home activity, we relate the value of home production to time at home
according to







where ht are market hours. We assume ￿ is ￿nite, implying diminishing returns to non-market
time, 1￿ht, for the home activity. Our speci￿cation will yield a Frisch elasticity of labor supply
for market hours ht (the intensive margin) of ￿(1￿ht
ht ).3
There is also a continuum of identical agents we refer to as entrepreneurs (or ￿rms). En-
trepreneurs have the ability to create job vacancies with a cost ￿ per vacancy. In calibrating
we allow this cost to di⁄er by skill and hours of the employment position, making it a function





A worker is either matched with an entrepreneur (employed) and works or unmatched (un-
employed) and available for a new match. A worker, when working, earns wages wt. Note that wt
refers to the wage payment per period of employment, not the rate per hour. (The hourly wage
rate is wt=ht.) This wage will di⁄er across the workers, re￿ ecting di⁄erences in a, b, and match
quality as discussed below. These earnings are used to consume market goods. We assume,
however, that there are some expenditures required by being employed, e.g. for transportation
or clothing, that are not valued in cmt. We set these expenditures to ! per period employed.
Because they constitute a smaller share of earnings for high-wage, high-hours workers, this is
an added source of market comparative advantage for these workers. If unemployed, a worker
3We label cn as home production, but one could alternatively view it as the value of leisure. The interpretation
as home production strikes us as slightly more natural, given that we allow heterogeneity across workers in the
e¢ cacy of their non-market time. But one can certainly contemplate workers di⁄ering in how they view the
payo⁄s to leisure activities. Burda and Hammermesh (2009) examine how the unemployed spend their time based
on time-use surveys. They ￿nd that the unemployed spend most of their extra non-market time in added leisure
and personal maintenance. But, by contrast, when the unemployment rate increases disproportionately in an
area cyclically the reduced time in market work is o⁄set almost entirely by added time allocated to household
production.
4receives an unemployment income bene￿t of ￿. In calibrating we allow ￿ to di⁄er by a worker￿ s
long-term earnings as captured by a and b.
There are two technologies in this economy￿ one that describes the production of output by
a matched worker-entrepreneur pair and another that describes the process by which workers
and entrepreneurs become matched. A matched pair produces output
yt = axtztht;
where a is the worker￿ s ability, xt is idiosyncratic match-speci￿c productivity (i.e., match qual-
ity), zt is aggregate productivity, and ht are market hours worked. Idiosyncratic match produc-
tivity and aggregate productivity evolve over time according to Markov processes, respectively
Pr[xt+1 < x0jxt = x] = F(x0jx) and Pr[zt+1 < z0jzt = z] = D(z0jz).
We assume that the matching markets are segmented by worker type (a;b). These separate
markets can be interpreted as search and matching that is directed by skill and by desired hours,
as workers with a high value of home time will be interested in shorter hours (e.g., part-time
jobs).4 The number of new meetings between the unemployed and vacancies in each market is




v is the number of vacancies, while u is the number of unemployed workers. i indexes the market,
where i re￿ ects a￿b. The matching rate for an unemployed worker is p(￿t) = mt=ut = ￿￿￿
t , where
￿t = vt=ut is the vacancy-unemployment ratio, i.e. labor market "tightness". The probability
that a vacant job matches with a worker is q(￿t) = mt=vt = ￿￿￿￿1
t .
A matched worker-￿rm constitutes a bilateral monopoly. We assume the wage is set by
bargaining between the worker and ￿rm over the match surplus, as discussed just below, where
match surplus re￿ ects the value of the match relative to the summed worker￿ s value of being
unemployed and the entrepreneur￿ s value of an unmatched vacancy (which is zero in equilibrium).
There are no wage or other bargaining rigidities. Therefore, separations are e¢ cient for the
worker-￿rm pair, occurring if and only if match surplus falls below zero. Furthermore the choice
of hours worked within the match is e¢ cient, maximizing match value.
The timing of events is as follows. (1) At the beginning of each period matches from the
4Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2009) characterize separating contracts in a search environment, such as here,
with distinct types. Signalling high labor supply, by searching in a market that speci￿es employment with longer
hours, will be more costly for low-labor supply workers.
5previous period￿ s search and matching are realized. Also aggregate productivity z and each
match￿ s idiosyncratic productivity x are realized. (2) Upon observing x and z; matched workers
and entrepreneurs decide whether to continue as an employed match. Workers breaking up
with an entrepreneur become unemployed, with the match permanently ended. (3) For matched
workers, hours and wages are chosen and production takes place. Hours are chosen to maximize
match surplus with the wage re￿ ecting worker-￿rm bargaining. Concurrent with production,
unemployed workers and vacancies engage in the search/matching process.
2.2. Value functions and choices for hours, separations, and wages
We turn next to describing the value functions for employed and unemployed workers, as well as
the determination of hours and wages within matches. The assumptions above of linear utility
in consumption, linear production in labor, and a constant returns to scale matching function
imply that choices for vacancies, separations, hours, and wages in the market for one labor group
(e.g., the high market-skill, high labor-supply market) are independent of choices and outcomes
in the other labor markets. For this reason, for the balance of this section we dispense with
indexing variables with the index i for market type. We also dispense with time subscripts:
variables are understood to refer to time period t, unless marked with a prime (0) denoting
period t + 1.
First consider the choice of hours. We assume that ￿rms and workers bargain e¢ ciently,
maximizing the value of match surplus. This requires choosing hours to equate the marginal
product of an hour in the market to its marginal bene￿t at home: axz = ab(1 ￿ h)￿1=￿. So
optimal hours at the intensive margin for a worker are




Turning to the value functions, a worker￿ s valuation of being employed is













Note that the expenditures necessitated by employment, !, are netted from the wage payment.
The value of home production re￿ ects the optimal choice of market hours h￿. The maximization
problem implicit in W(x;z) is to choose a cut-o⁄ value, x￿, such that the match persists only if
match quality x exceeds that value.
6The value of being unemployed is









Home production for the unemployed is normalized to zero. Recall that p(￿) is the probability
that an unemployed worker matches with a vacancy. We assume that new matches begin with
a match quality equal to the mean, ￿ x, for the distribution of x. For the parameter values we
consider, this ensures that workers will in fact accept new matches.5
For an entrepreneur the value of a matched job is:
J(x;z) = axz(1 ￿ (
b
xz





The value for current production re￿ ects the optimal choice for hours. For a Frisch elasticity
￿ strictly greater than zero, hours are procyclical. In turn, this adds to the procyclicality of J:
The value of a matched job J re￿ ects the option value of being able to end the match for t + 1
if match quality falls below x￿.
The value of a vacancy is:









where recall that ￿ is the vacancy posting cost and q(￿) is the probability that a vacancy is
￿lled. With free-entry in creating vacancies, in equilibrium V (z) will equal zero.
We assume the wage payment is set by Nash bargaining between the worker and ￿rm over






J(x;z) ￿ V (z)
￿1￿￿
;
where 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 re￿ ects worker share of match surplus. This wage payment is predictably
increasing in ability a, especially since a increases the value of non-market as well as market
5Alternatively, we could allow that new matches draw from a distribution of match qualities. The creation of
new employment matches would then mimic our endogenous model of the separation decision￿ new employment
matches would occur conditional on both matching and drawing a match quality x above a critical value x
￿. Our
model predicts less creation of vacancies for workers with low comparative advantage in the market, resulting in
these workers having a lower ￿nding rate. Our model also predicts that these workers will exhibit a higher value
for critical match quality x
￿. Therefore, extending the model to allow for endogenous take up of new matches
would reduce the ￿nding rate further for workers with low comparative advantage. We do not pursue this, largely
because the model already predicts a lower ￿nding rate for workers with low hours than we observe in the SIPP
data.
7time. For ￿ < 1, the wage will also be increasing in relative home productivity b. For ￿ > 0, the
wage payment is increasing in match productivity x and aggregate productivity z. The impacts
of x and z on the wage payment re￿ ect not only their direct roles in productivity, but also their
positive impacts on hours worked.
3. Fitting the Model to Data
We ￿rst describe the SIPP data, then use it to construct statistics on employment and turnover
for four distinct groups based on workers￿long-run hourly wages and hours worked when em-
ployed. We next calibrate the model to feature four groups that align with the wage and hours
dispersion we see in the SIPP. Finally, we examine how well the model matches the data in
terms of rates of employment and turnover across the four groups.
3.1. Our SIPP sample
The SIPP is a longitudinal survey of households designed to be representative of the U.S. popu-
lation.6 It consists of a series of overlapping longitudinal panels. Each panel is about three years
in duration. Each panel is large, containing samples of about 20,000 households. Households are
interviewed every four months. At each interview, information on work experience (employers,
hours, earnings) are collected for the three preceding as well as most recent month. The ￿rst
survey panel, the 1984 panel, was initiated in October 1983. Each year through 1993 a new
panel was begun. New, slightly longer, panels were initiated in 1996 and again in 2001. In our
analysis we pool the 12 panels, with the exception of the panel for 1989, which is very short in
duration. Given the timing of panels, the number of households in our pooled sample will vary
over time, with a gap between surveys at the beginning of 1996 and during 2000.
For our purposes the SIPP has some distinct advantages. Compared to the CPS, its panel
structure allows us to compare workers by long-term wages or hours. It also provides infor-
mation on employer turnover. Unlike the CPS, respondents who change household addresses
are followed.7 The SIPP has both a larger and more representative sample than the PSID or
NLS panels. Individuals are interviewed every four months, rather than annually, so respon-
dents￿recall of hours, earnings, and employment turnover since the prior interview should be
considerably better.
6We do employ SIPP sampling weights, however, in constructing all reported statistics. These weights are
designed to maintain a representative sample despite sample attrition.
7Fujita, Nekarda, and Ramey (2007) present detailed results on the cyclicality of separation and ￿nding rates
for all workers in the SIPP, comparing these to patterns in the CPS.
8We restrict our sample to men between the ages of 20 and 60. Individuals must not be in the
armed forces, not disabled, not be attending school full-time, and must have remained in the
survey for at least a year. We further restrict the analysis to those who averaged at least one
month of employment per year (so at least three separate months for someone with a typical
three years of interviews) and who have data on both hours worked and earnings for at least one
month.8 The pooled sample that results consists of 73,416 separate individuals, representing
data on employment status for 1,925,354 monthly observations.9
We focus on a respondent￿ s monthly rates for being employed in a match, separating from
employment, ￿nding employment, hours worked, and hourly wages. We de￿ne a worker as
employed in a match if he reports being with a job the entire month (with no more than two
weeks without pay) and reports no weeks primarily involved in search. We also classify a worker
who is temporarily away from work as employed in a match provided he returns to the same
employer within three months and reports no weeks of searching. In this case, weeks not actively
working are re￿ ected in the worker￿ s measured hour worked conditional on being matched￿ the
intensive margin.10 We will typically refer to men not employed in a match as unemployed. We
believe this best conforms to the model￿ s de￿nition of unemployment. But note that, unlike
o¢ cial unemployment statistics, this classi￿cation does not require that the unemployed worker
report actively searching for employment. Our sample of men averages an employment (matched)
rate of 92.9%, with 7.1% for unemployed (unmatched). Our measures for monthly job separation
and ￿nding rates follow immediately given the de￿nition for being matched with an employer:
A separation corresponds to transiting from being matched to unmatched; a job ￿nding is a
transition from unmatched to matched. These rates average, respectively, 1.5% and 18.5%
monthly for our sample.
Our measure of hours worked in a month (the intensive margin) re￿ ects variations in hours
worked per week, weeks worked per month, and occurrences of temporary layo⁄s.11 We ￿rst
multiply hours worked per week times weeks worked per month, then take the natural log. To
8We treat self-employed workers as employed, rather than unemployed. We base a worker￿ s market wage rates
and hour worked only on months working for an employer (not self-employed) and only on months with usual
weekly hours of at least 10.
9The SIPP interviews provide distinct answers on employment status and weeks worked for each of the prior
four months. But for wage rates and weekly hours the data attribute the same values for each of the four months
covered in an interview. Therefore, we restrict attention to the survey month observations in examining the
cyclicality of hours and wage rates in Section 4.
10Just under one-half of one percent of our sample fall under this "temporary layo⁄" category. So it does not
have much impact on rates of employment and unemployment.
11Our measured weeks worked adjusts for the number of weeks in a month. Measured hours worked per week
can re￿ ect hours worked at up to two jobs.
9re￿ ect temporary layo⁄s, we then add to this a term (￿=￿ ￿ ￿ 1), where ￿ is a zero/one variable
equal to one if not on temporary layo⁄s, and ￿ ￿ is the mean value of ￿ (0.995 for our sample). But
variability in this component, temporary layo⁄s, contributes relatively little to the variability of
our measured intensive margin either cyclically or in judging workers￿relative long-term hours.
We measure the wage rate by the hourly rate of pay on the main job. More than sixty percent
of workers report a wage in this form. For the others we construct an hourly rate from their
reported hours and earnings, based on how the hourly wage projects on these variables for those
who do report an hourly wage. We de￿ ate the wage rate by the Consumer Price Index.
3.2. Employment and turnover by long-term wages and hours in the SIPP
For each worker we ￿rst calculate their average (long-run) wage rate and average (long-run)
hours worked. We then put the workers into one of four bins based on whether their long-run
wage is above or below the median value and whether their long-run hours are above or below
the median. To construct these we average a worker￿ s (ln) hourly wage rates and (ln) hours
worked over all months employed.12 The median long-term wage is $16.63 per hour in January
2009 dollars. The median long-term hours worked is 180 per month. The standard deviations
equal 42% for the hourly wage and 19% for hours worked. The correlation between long-term
wage and long-term hours is positive, but fairly small, at 0.15.
Statistics for the four groups, low-wage/low-hours, low-wage/high-hours, et cetera, are con-
tained in Table 1 through 3. Table 1 reports each group￿ s share in the sample. Re￿ ecting
the modest positive correlation between long-term wage and hours, the diagonal groups, low-
wage/low-hours and high-wage/high-hours are modestly larger, each at 26.7% of the sample,
than the o⁄-diagonal groups, low-wage/high-hours and high-wage/low-hours, each at 23.3% of
the sample. But it is worth noting that the o⁄-diagonal groups still combine for nearly half
(46.6%) of the sample. For this reason, it would greatly misrepresent the data to model hetero-
geneity in labor supply as captured only by heterogeneity in market skills.
Table 2 reports each group￿ s mean long-term (ln) wage and mean long-term (ln) hours, both
12We ￿rst project the natural log of a worker￿ s hourly wage for each month, the natural log of his hours per
month conditional being actively employed, and his value for the temporary layo⁄ variable (￿=￿ ￿ ￿ 1) on a full
set of monthly dummies to obtain the worker￿ s residual wage, hours, and layo⁄ variable relative to other person￿ s
for that month. (This regression also includes a dummy variable for whether data is drawn from the earlier or
later SIPP panels, as some hours and earnings variables change slightly beginning with the 1996 panel.) The
residuals for these variables are then averaged across months for an individual to obtain his long-term wage and
hours worked. Long-term hours worked re￿ ects the sum of the variables for the worker￿ s long-term hours worked
conditional on being actively employed and his long-term mean for the variable capturing not on temporary layo⁄
(￿=￿ ￿ ￿ 1).
10expressed as its deviation from the mean for the entire sample. Overall, the high-wage workers
exhibit 68% higher wages than the low-wage workers, with this di⁄erential 71% among workers
with low hours and 64% among workers with high hours. High-hours workers, overall, work 25%
more market hours than low-hours workers, with this di⁄erential a little larger among workers
with low wages, 28%, than among low-wage workers, 22%.13
Table 3 reports employment and turnover rates across the four groups. We focus ￿rst on
the two extreme groups along the diagonal. Low-wage/low-hours worker exhibit an employ-
ment rate of only 87.6% compared to 96.8% for those with both high wages and high hours
worked, conditional on employment. This di⁄erential appears more extreme if viewed in terms
of the unemployment rates, representing a rate nearly four times as large (12.4%) for the low-
wage/low-hours group compared to that (3.2%) for men with high wages and hours. Given
this extreme di⁄erential, it is not surprising that the low-wage/low-hours workers display both
higher separation rates and lower ￿nding rates. But this di⁄erence is much more striking for
separation rates. Workers with low wages and hours show three times the separation rate as the
opposite extreme group (2.4% versus 0.8%), whereas their ￿nding rate is only lower by a factor
of about 20 to 25%. Thus, most of the di⁄erence in employment rates between the two groups
can be mapped back to the di⁄erence in separation rates.
Employment rates for the o⁄-diagonal groups are intermediate to these two extremes. The
employment rate for the low-wage/high-hours workers is 92.1%; for the high-wage/low-hours
workers it is 95.0%. Rates of separation project much more on workers￿long-term wage rates,
whereas ￿nding rates are better explained by di⁄erences in hours worked. Workers with low-
wages and high-hours actually show a slightly higher ￿nding rate (22.1%) than high-wage/high-
hours workers (21.3%). But the separation rate for these workers (1.9%) is much closer to that of
the low-wage/low-hours workers. Similarly, the ￿nding rate for high-wage/low-hours workers is
even lower than that for the extreme group with both low wages and hours. But their separation
rate (1.0%) is much closer to that of the high-wage/high-hours extreme.
13Appendix tables A1 and A2 report on the distributions of schooling attainment and age for each of the four
groups. The high-wage groups average about 1.5 more years of schooling than the low-wage groups, while the
high-hours groups are, on average, about 2.1 years younger than those working less than the median number of
hours. (Workers ages 51 to 60 are less common among low-wage workers who work high hours.) But it is clear
that schooling and age di⁄erences capture only a modest part of the dispersion in wages and hours across groups.
Appendix table A3 reports the fraction of workers in each group employed in cyclical industries￿ manufacturing,
construction, and transportation. The fraction in cyclical industries is fairly similar across the four groups. So
di⁄erences in employment cyclicality by group, reported below, should not heavily re￿ ect di⁄erences in industry
composition. The fraction in cyclical industries is modestly higher for the high-wage workers, averaging 43%,
than for the low-wage, 34%. It is essentially the same for high-hours workers, 39%, and low-hours workers, 38%.
113.3. Calibrating the model
There are four types of workers in our model economy, with these types distinguished by two
distinct values for market ability, a, and two distinct values for home productivity relative to
market, b. All parameters except the payment for unemployment bene￿ts and the ￿rm vacancy
posting cost will be common across these four groups. (As described below, the unemployment
bene￿ts and posting cost are assumed proportional to the workers￿long-term market output.)
We proceed by ￿rst calibrating these common parameters to ￿t data for the high-wage/high-
hours group, the group that is most strongly attached to the labor market. We typically will
refer to this as the southeast group, corresponding to their location in the tables. The key
outcomes we target are the average rates of employment, separations, and job ￿nding for the
high-wage/high-hours group in the SIPP data. (See the southeast corner of Table 2.) After
calibrating for this southeast group, we then choose values for a and b to map out the remaining
three groups to be consistent with dispersion we reported in Table 1 for wage rates and hours
from the SIPP data. We then ask how well the model captures rates of employment and turnover
for these groups.
The two preference parameters to calibrate are the discount factor and the Frisch elasticity
for the intensive labor margin. We use a monthly discount factor ￿ of 0.9966, implying an
annualized real interest rate of 4%. The Frisch elasticity, equal to ￿(1￿h
h ), re￿ ects both the
parameter ￿ and the level of hours worked. Recall that hours worked equal 1 ￿ ( b
xz)￿. We ￿rst
normalize market ability a for the southeast group to one. We further normalize, for all groups,
the mean for the distribution of match quality, x, and steady-state aggregate productivity, z,
both to one. This implies market hours for the southeast group, evaluated at mean match
quality, of 1 ￿ b￿. Finally, we set b and ￿ so that market hours equal 0:5 with a Frisch labor
supply elasticity of one third. This requires ￿ = 1=3 and b = 1=8. Kimball and Shapiro (2003)
and Hall (2009) each survey estimates for the Frisch elasticity. Much of the evidence suggests
a value of 0:5 or below. Hall, largely based on Pistaferri (2003), chooses a value of 0.7. As
discussed below, we impose the same parameter value of 1=3 for ￿ across our four groups. This
implies a larger Frisch elasticity for workers who work shorter hours, with the average Frisch
elasticity across our groups equal to 0:44.
The key outcomes we target are the average rates of separations and job ￿nding for the
southeast group in the SIPP data. In turn, these rates depend primarily on the replacement
rate while unemployed, the size of idiosyncratic shocks to matches, and the vacancy posting cost.
The size of the replacement rate re￿ ects the unemployment bene￿t, ￿, the expenditure saved by
12not working, !, and the extra home production when unemployed. We set the unemployment
bene￿t ￿ equal to 0:1, which corresponds to 20% of long-terms earnings for the southeast group.14
Shimer (2005) assumes a replacement rate of 40%; but for his calibration this rate should re￿ ect
any gains with unemployment from increased leisure or home production, whereas we have this
as an explicit, separate component. We set the expenditure necessitated by work, !, at 0:05,
which represents 10% of long-run earnings.15 The gain in home production while unemployed
for the southeast group (given the values for h, b, and ￿) equals 37:5% of market productivity.
Combined with the unemployment bene￿ts and expenditures required for working, this yields a
steady-state replacement ratio equivalent to 67:5% of market output for the southeast group.16
This value is considerably higher than the 40% employed by Shimer￿ s calibration, but close to the
replacement rates assumed by Costain and Reiter (2003) and by Hall (2005a). Those authors,
however, employ that ratio for all workers, whereas we employ it only for high-wage/high-hours
workers.
We assume shocks to match-speci￿c productivity are highly persistent, setting their autocor-
relation equal to 0:98. We then set the volatility of these shocks, ￿x, together with the vacancy
posting cost, ￿, in order to mimic the monthly separation and ￿nding rates (0.77% and 21.3%)
that we observe for the southeast group in the SIPP data. This is approximately achieved by
￿x = 0:026 and ￿ = 0:30. Given ￿x, the model generates a dispersion in match quality among
employed workers of about 5%. We view this as a conservative value for dispersion in match
quality￿ it translates to only one eighth the standard deviation in wages we observe in the SIPP
data.17 The vacancy posting cost translates into a cost per hiring of about six week￿ s expected
14Hall (2005b) shows that the replacement rate has been about 15 percent in recent years. We prefer to err on
the high side in calibrating the replacement rate, as a lower rate would serve to reinforce our negative conclusions
for the model discussed in Section 4.
15Aguiar and Hurst (2009) argue, based on life-cycle spending patterns, that an important component of
spending on food away from home, clothing, and transportation re￿ ect employment variation over the lifecycle.
They regress spending shares by category on separate dummy variables for employment of the husband and wife.
The estimated impact of employment, given total consumption, just on these three categories support assuming
that 5% or more of consumer spending is driven by employment expenses. In addition, any costs that fall on the
employer that have a ￿xed, per worker, nature should also be folded into !, as these costs would act in the model
precisely like the expenditures in !. One example of such costs are payroll taxes (e.g., FICA or for UI) that have
a per worker component or are capped above some earnings level.
16This is evaluated for match quality, x; equal to its expected value of 1. Workers select into values of match
quality that average higher, as bad matches lead to separations. For our calibration, this selection raises pro-
ductivity and wages by about three percent. The replacement rate relative to mean actual earnings is about 65
percent for the southeast group.
17Woodcock (2007) allows for individual, employer, and match components in explaining dispersion in earnings
for a large sample of matched employer-employee records across 37 states. He ￿nds a standard deviation of the
match component in earnings that is more than one-third the standard deviation in overall earnings. Increas-
ing dispersion in match quality would reinforce our primary conclusions that the DMP model fails to generate
13output. For the Cobb-Douglas matching technology, m(v;u) = :3v￿u1￿￿ hits the steady-state
￿nding rate. We set both the matching power parameter ￿ and the bargaining share for workers
￿ equal to 0:5. Finally, the model￿ s separation and ￿nding rates for the southeast group, 0.75%
and 22.3%, together imply a steady-state employment rate of 96.7%.
We now turn to the parameters that vary across groups. We choose the size of the four groups
to match those in the SIPP data: 27% for high-wage/high-hours and low-wage/low-hours, and
23% for high-wage/low-hours and low-wage/high-hours. We choose the earnings ability for low-
wage groups (a = 0:5) to make the cross-sectional dispersion of log wages across our four groups
in the model roughly comparable to that of long-term wages in the SIPP data. For the low-hours
groups, we set relative home productivity (relative to market) equal to 0:25 in order to generate a
cross-sectional dispersion in log hours that mimics the data. Summarizing, the ability parameters
are f(a;b) = (1;0:125);(1;0:25);(0:5;0:125);(0:5;0:25)g, respectively, for workers with high-
wage/high-hours, high-wage/low-hours, low-wage/high-hours, and low-wage/low-hours.
We allow two parameters, the unemployment bene￿t (￿) and vacancy posting cost (￿) to
vary across groups. We make each proportional to that group￿ s long-term earnings. Scaling ￿ to
earnings gets at the practice that unemployment insurance is proportioned to past earnings.18
The replacement ratios for these four groups, which de￿ne the rents to employment relative
to market productivity, are respectively 67.5%, 77.5%, 84.8%, and 98.4%. We view this as a
generous calibration for these replacements rates￿ the average rate across the groups is 82% and
the low-wage, low-hours workers (27% of all workers) are assumed to have very low rents from
market employment. We scale the posting cost to the group￿ s long-term earnings to re￿ ect data
(e.g. head-hunter￿ s fees) that typically express the employer￿ s costs for matching in terms of
compensation at the job. The values implied for ￿ across the four groups are respectively 0.30,
0.22, 0.15, and 0.11.19
cyclicality in the extensive margin. By increasing match rents, separations become less responsive to aggregate
cyclical shocks, yielding less cyclical employment.
18Anderson and Meyer report the level of unemployment bene￿ts by wage decile based on the 1993 panel of the
SIPP data. Bene￿ts, as a share of earnings, are much lower at higher wages. But unemployment is also greatly
skewed toward lower wage workers. If the breakdowns in bene￿ts by wage from Anderson and Meyer are viewed
together with a breakdown in unemployment by wage, this suggests an elasticity of unemployment bene￿ts with
respect to wage that is close to one.
19More exactly, ￿ and ￿ are scaled to the group￿ s steady-state product (a￿h(a;b)) evaluated at match quality
at its mean value. Long-term earnings are slightly higher, re￿ ecting selection on match quality.
143.4. How well does the model ￿t the cross-section?
Table 4 presents the model￿ s steady-state wages and hours worked for each of the four labor
groups. Each high-wage group, for low or high hours, displays a wage that is about 68% greater
than the low-wage group with comparable hours. The model generates slightly lower, 1 to 2%,
lower wages for high-hours workers. This re￿ ects both that high-hours workers exhibit a lower
reservation match quality for staying employed and bargain for a slightly lower wage, given
productivity. The di⁄erence in wages across groups in Table 4 matches very closely the average
di⁄erential by group observed in the SIPP data (Table 2). But wage dispersion in the SIPP,
with standard deviation 0.42, is greater than that for our model economy, 0.34, as it re￿ ects
dispersion within as well as between the four groups. Turning to hours, each high-hours group
for the model displays hours worked of about 27% higher than that for the low-hours group with
comparable wage rates. This is close to what we see in the SIPP data, where those di⁄erentials
are about 25%. The model generates an overall standard deviation in hours worked of 15%,
lower than that of 19% for the SIPP data. The cross-sectional correlation of log hours and log
wages in our model is 0.05, somewhat lower than that in the SIPP (0.15). The higher standard
deviations of wages and hours, and their slightly higher correlation, in the SIPP data re￿ ects its
heterogeneity of wages and hours within each of the four groups. This is missing for the model
simulated data, except for the e⁄ects of small di⁄erences in match quality. (For this reason, in
examining the cyclical behavior of hours for each group in Section 4, we correct for any cyclical
compositional e⁄ects within each group.)
Table 5 presents the employment, separation, and ￿nding rates for the model￿ s steady state
by group. We focus ￿rst on the two extreme groups: low-wages/low-hours workers (the northwest
cell in the tables) and high-wage/high-hours (the southeast). The employment, separation, and
￿nding rates for the southeast group all correspond closely, by construction, to those observed
in the SIPP data (Table 3). The model yields an employment rate of 83.8% for the northwest
group. So the unemployment rate for the northwest group, 16.2%, is nearly ￿ve times that for
the southeast group. This is close to, but a bit more extreme than, what we see in the SIPP,
which shows an unemployment rate for the northwest group of 12.4%. For the northwest group
the model exhibits separation and ￿nding rates that are both lower, at 1.9% and 8.8%, than
observed in the SIPP, 2.4% and 16.8%. Like the data, the model predicts intermediate employ-
ment rates, intermediate to the southeast and northwest groups, for the o⁄-diagonal groups with,
respectively, high wages and low hours (northeast group) and low wages and high hours (south-
west group). But the model predicts higher unemployment for the high-wage/low-hours group
15(6.1%) than for the low-wage/high-hours (4.5%), whereas for the data this is reversed (5.0% for
the northeast group and 7.9% for the southwest). Most notably, the model under-predicts the
separation rate for the low-wage/high-hours group, predicting a rate of 0.9% compared to 1.9%
in the SIPP data. More generally, that is with the exception of understating the separation rate
for low-wage workers, the model does reasonably well.
The di⁄erences in separation and ￿nding rates across the four groups are directly related
to the rents to employment. These rents are represented by the di⁄erence between the match
quality, x, that a worker has in employment versus the critical match quality, x￿, at which the
match would be dissolved￿ a match with x = x￿ would have zero rents. In Figure 1 we present
the distributions of x ￿ x￿ separately for each of the groups. The northwest group (lower wage
and hours) is distinct from the other three. In particular, the fraction with x ￿ x￿ below ￿ve
percent is nearly twice as large for this group than for the other three. This explains why the
model predicts a steady-state separation rate that is nearly twice as high for this northwest
group than it predicts averaging over the other three groups. The distributions of x￿x￿ are also
telling for the cyclical behavior of separations and employment across the four groups, which
we examine next. The larger number of workers with low values for x ￿ x￿ for the northwest
group predictably leads to a sharper increase in separations during a downturn for this group.
Secondly, the lower average value of x ￿ x￿ for the northwest group means that a decline in
aggregate productivity, which increases x￿, will create a greater percentage drop in x ￿ x￿, in
turn causing a larger reduction in vacancy creation rates and ￿nding rates for this group.
4. Business Cycles, Model vs. Data
We are now in position to compare the labor market business cycles produced by our calibrated
model to what we observe from the SIPP data. We create business cycles for the model by
hitting each group with persistent shocks to aggregate productivity z. (These shocks display
an autocorrelation of 0:97, with innovation standard deviation of 0:37%.) We ￿rst compare
the model and data in terms of their predictions for the relative size of cyclical ￿ uctuations in
employment across the four groups. Secondly, we examine whether the model and data conform
in their predictions for the relative importance of the intensive, hours margin and the extensive,
employment margin for each of the groups. Thirdly, we look in more detail at the employment
response by examining the cyclicality of separation and ￿nding rates across the four groups.
Lastly, we examine the cyclical implications of aggregating our four labor groups.
164.1. Cyclicality in hours and employment
In Table 6 we compare the responses of employment for each of the four groups to aggregated
employment, comparing the model predictions to the evidence from the SIPP. For both the
SIPP and model series we HP ￿lter with monthly smoothing parameter 900,000. We also re-
move monthly seasonals for the SIPP-based series.20 We instrument for aggregated employment
reported in the SIPP based on the U.S. unemployment rate for men and average weekly hours for
workers, both reported by the BLS. (The unemployment rate is based on the Current Population
Surveys, weekly hours on Current Employment Statistics.) We instrument so that measurement
error in the SIPP does not in￿ uence the estimated relative importance of employment responses
across groups or the relative importance of employment and hours responses.
Focusing on the extreme groups in Table 6, both the model and the data display much
larger cyclical employment responses for low-wage, low-hours workers than for those workers
with higher wages and hours, but for the model this contrast is more extreme. For the data, the
employment response for the northwest group (low-wage/low-hours) is 1.7 times the aggregate
response, whereas for the model that ratio is 3.0. For the data, the employment response for the
southeast group (high-wage/high-hours) is only 0.42 times the aggregate response; but for the
model it is less than half that, at 0.17. In the SIPP data the intermediate groups each display
cyclical employment responses that are 0.7 times the aggregate response. For the model these
responses are 0.55 for those with high wages, but low hours, and 0.34 for those with low wages,
but high hours. In sum, for the model employment cyclicality is con￿ned to a greater degree to
the low-wage, low-hours workers compared to what we see in the data.
In Table 7 we compare the responses, in the data versus the model, of hours worked and em-
ployment to cyclical movements in aggregate total labor hours￿ i.e. hours times employment.21
We instrument for aggregated total hours reported in the SIPP, again based on the national
unemployment rate for men and national weekly hours. The model and the data match remark-
ably well for the low-wage, low-hours workers￿ both predict a greater cyclical response for the
20The SIPP surveys have breaks in coverage during 1996 and 2000. These breaks are exaccerbated because we
restrict our employment series to months that re￿ ect at least half of a full SIPP panel, and a panel rotates in
(and out) over a four month period. This results in a time series for employment from August 1983 to September
2003, with 226 monthly observations plus 16 missing months. (We base the HP ￿lter for a SIPP-based series on
that series with interpolated values for the missing gaps.)
21Aggregated total hours equals the average across all workers of the sum of ln(hours) and the percentage
deviation of the zero/one employment rate from its mean value. For the data, the hours statistics correct for
cyclical compositional changes by long-term hours within each group. For each group we calculate a time-series
for the mean ￿xed e⁄ect of employed workers for hours. The series for the ￿xed e⁄ect in hours is then netted
from the time series for hours.
17extensive margin, in fact both predict an employment response that is 2.5 times the cyclical
response in the intensive margin. But for each of the other three groups the model substantially
under predicts the relative cyclicality of the employment margin. For both intermediate groups
the model predicts cyclical responses in the hours margin that are more than double that for
employment; but in the data this ratio is nearly reversed. For the high-wage, high-hours group
both the data and the model show a greater response in hours, rather than employment. But the
model predicts an hours response that is nearly ￿ve times the magnitude of that for employment,
whereas in the data these responses are comparable in size.
The model does not capture the cyclicality of employment for workers with comparative ad-
vantage even though the replacement rates we allow for these workers￿ 67% for high-wage/high-
hours workers and an average of 80% for the two groups o⁄ the diagonal￿ is fairly high. More
importantly, increasing replacement rates, for example by raising the fraction of earnings re-
placed by unemployment insurance, is not a reasonable solution. To generate a cyclical response
in employment (relative to hours) for high-wage/high-hours workers like what we see in the
data requires doubling unemployment insurance, from 20 to 40% of earnings. But calibrating
unemployment insurance at this level, while respecting the wage and hours di⁄erences across
workers, drives the total replacement rate on average above 100% for the other three groups. In
particular, the replacement rate for workers with low wages and hours goes well above 100%.
As a result, the model predicts zero employment for these workers, whereas in the data their
employment rate is over 80%.22
4.2. Cyclicality in separation and ￿nding rates
The responses, by group, of separation and ￿nding rates to the aggregate total labor hours are
given in Table 8. We know from Table 7 that the response in employment in the data exceeds
that predicted by the model for each of the groups except those with low wages and low hours.
The results in Table 8 suggest whether this re￿ ects an inability to predict the cyclicality of
22The model assumes Frisch elasticities for hours of one third for high-hours workers and a little over one half for
workers with lower hours. One might conjecture that the model￿ s failure to capture the relative importance of the
extensive versus intensive margins could be ￿xed by assuming smaller Frisch elasticities. But this is problematic.
Reducing the Frisch elasticity makes market and non-market work poorer substitutes, which acts to increase the
gains from employment. For instance, cutting the Frisch elasticities in half reduces the e⁄ective replacement
value from leisure by 18% of earnings for high-hours workers and by 23% of earnings for low-hours workers. As
a result, the model will generate much smaller employment ￿ uctuations for all groups. This is exaccerbated by
the fact that, to generate realistic separations with the higher employment rents, the calibrated model requires
larger match-speci￿c shocks (larger ￿x), further insulating employment from cyclical shocks. Thus, reducing the
Frisch elasticity to low values does not correct the failure of the model to predict the cyclicality of employment
compared to hours.
18separations or that of ￿ndings.
The results di⁄er notably by group. For three of the groups, all but the low-wage, high-hours
group, separations are more countercyclical for the data than predicted by the model, with this
mismatch most striking for the two groups with higher wages. By contrast, separations in the
data are acyclical for the group with low wages, but high hours. Turning to ￿nding rates, we
see that both the data and model display procyclical ￿nding rates for all four groups. But for
the most cyclical workers, those with low wages and low hours, the model predicts ￿nding rates
that are far too cyclical. For this group most of the cyclical action in the SIPP data occurs
through countercyclical separations. By contrast, the model under predicts the cyclicality of the
￿nding rate for high-hours workers, particularly those with lower wage rates.23 To summarize,
our calibrated DMP model fails to explain how much separations increase during recessions,
particularly for high-wage workers, and how much the ￿nding rates falls during recessions for
high-hours workers.
4.3. Aggregate patterns
Aggregation puts a disproportionate weight on the low-wage, low-hours workers due to their
much greater cyclicality. Table 9 presents statistics on cyclicality of hours versus employment,
for the SIPP data and for our model economy, aggregating the workers into a single workforce.
In the data cyclical ￿ uctuations in employment are more important, contributing about 70%
of ￿ uctuations in total hours. The model￿ s aggregated simulated data predicts that cyclical
￿ uctuations are re￿ ected about equally in hours (48%) and employment (52%). So the model
understates the importance of the extensive margin. Aggregating does increase the importance
of the employment margin for the model, compared to the simple average of its importance
across each of the four groups reported in Table 8. This re￿ ects the disproportionate weight
of the low-wage, low-hours workers in aggregate ￿ uctuations. For this group the model does
generate that 70% of ￿ uctuations occur through the extensive margin.
Table 10 presents the responses of aggregate turnover rates to total labor hours for both
the data and model. For our model a 1% increase in aggregate total hours is associated with
23Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005a) each point to wage rigidities as a possible explanation for very procyclical
￿nding rates. But wages are actually more procyclical for this group, those with low-wages and high hours, than
for the other three. More generally, we do not draw comparisons of wage cyclicality for the model and data
because it is di¢ cult to ascertain the allocative wage if there is wage smoothing as anticipated by the implicit
contracting literature. For example, we ￿nd an aggregate response of wages to total hours of 0.34 (standard error
of 0.12) compared to a model prediction of 1.02. But if we restrict the sample to new hires, those hired within
the past 12 months, the wage response in the SIPP data increases from 0.34 to 0.90 (with standard error of 0.32).
19a decrease in the separation rate of 2.5%. The data show a modestly larger decrease of 3.0%.
The cyclicality of the ￿nding rate, again conditioning on the same 1% increase in total labor, is
considerably larger for the model than data (5.3% for model compared to 3.9% for the data).
This discrepancy can largely be traced to the low-wage, low-hours workers. From Table 8, the
model predicts that much of cyclicality for this group occurs through the ￿nding rate, whereas
in the data cyclicality of employment is much more driven by the separation rate. This group
receives disproportionate weight in determining the aggregate cyclicality of the ￿nding rate as
they make up about half of the unemployed. For this reason, the aggregated statistics show a
coe¢ cient of cyclicality for the ￿nding rate, conditional on a change in total labor, that is well
above the model￿ s average across the four groups and well above that displayed by the data.24
For both the model and data, we see that separations are skewed during recessions toward
workers who work fewer hours, independently of the cycle. In turn, this creates a compositional
shift during recessions toward a pool of unemployed who: (a) typically work fewer hours, and
(b) display lower ￿nding rates. For the model we calculate that this compositional shift explains
about one-sixth of the cyclicality of the ￿nding rate for the aggregate economy (about one-
sixth of the coe¢ cient of 5.3). For the data there is also an important compositional shift in
separations and the unemployment pool toward workers who work fewer hours independently
of the cycle. But, because the ￿nding rates di⁄er less markedly across groups in the data, the
implications for the aggregate ￿nding rate are much smaller.25
24Shimer (2005) stresses that his calibrated DMP model generates a standard deviation for (ln)unemployment
relative to that for labor productivity that is about one half, whereas in the data this ratio is about 10. We have
not emphasized this statistic. Because we cannot say that the only disturbance to employment is productivity
shocks, we do not want to judge the model by unemployment￿ s volatility relative to volatility only in measured
productivity. But it is useful to report these relative volatiles for our model￿ s simulated business cycles to facilitate
comparing our model to others in the literature. Appendix Table A4 reports this statistic for the model for each
group. It also reports the correlation between unemployment and vacancies, the Beveridge Curve, by group.
When aggregated, the model economy generates a standard deviation for unemployment, relative to that of labor
productivity, of 4.8. This is much larger than for Shimer￿ s calibration (though less than half that for the data).
There are three reasons for this. Most importantly, Shimer assumes a 40% replacement whereas the average of
this rate across our four groups is much higher at 82%. Second, Shimer assumes a constant separation rate,
whereas our model￿ s separation rate is countercyclical and with a standard deviation comparable to that for
the unemployment rate. Third, because volatility increases non-linearly with the replacement rate, the very
high volatility for our low-wage, low-hours group is not o⁄set by the low volatility of the high-wage, high-hours
group. If we simulated our model economy with the same average replacement rate, but no heterogeneity, it
would produce a standard deviation for (ln)unemployment that is lower by nearly a third. The model economy
generates a Beveridge curve for the low-hours groups, but not for those with high hours. (The correlation between
unemployment and vacancies equals ￿0:47 for low-wage, low-hours workers, but only ￿0:04 for the group with
high wages and hours.) When aggregated, the model economy generates nearly as strong of a Beveridge Curve,
correlation ￿0:44, as that just for those with low wages and hours. This re￿ ects the disproportionate importance
of the low-wage, low-hours workers in the unemployment pool. It also re￿ ects the cyclical shift of the unemployed
pool during recessions toward this group, which generates a lower vacancy rate.
25For the model a percentage point drop in employment reduces the average long-term hours worked of the
205. Conclusions
We have examined the ability of a DMP model of unemployment to explain cyclical ￿ uctuations
in both the employment and hours margins. Key to generating large ￿ uctuations in the DMP
model is the presence of su¢ ciently many workers who have little comparative advantage in
the market (low rents to employment). Using the model, we map high market comparative
advantage to working high hours conditional on being employed. This allows us to calibrate our
model to the distribution of long-term wages and hours in panel data (the SIPP data).
The model correctly predicts higher separation and unemployment rates for workers with
lower long-term wages and hours (lower comparative advantage). For business cycles the model
predicts, correctly, that employment will be more cyclical for low-wage, low-hours workers. But
the model fails to capture the cyclical magnitude of separations, especially for high-wage workers.
Secondly, it fails to capture the capture the cyclical magnitude of the ￿nding rate for high-hours
workers. Together, these two failures cause it to considerably under predict the cyclicality of
employment except for those with low comparative advantage in the market, that is, those with
both low wages and hours.
unemployed by 0.5% purely from this compositional impact on the shares of the four groups in the unemployed
pool. The ￿nding rate is reduced by more than 1.5% for the same compositional reason￿ there are more low-hours
workers among the unemployed. For the data we ￿nd that this same compositional e⁄ect reduces the average
long-term hours of the unemployed by 0.2%, while also reducing the ￿nding rate of the unemployed by 0.2%.
Previous papers have argued that lower job-￿nding rates during recessions may re￿ ect a compositional shift to
unemployed workers who display lower job-￿nding rates. Darby, Haltiwanger, and Plant (1985) and Baker (1992)
focus on the possibility of a shift in separations toward prime-age males during recessions. Pries (2008) considers
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Deviation from Sample Means in Long-term Wages and Hours by Group 
(SIPP data) 
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Based on sample of 73,416 men.  Overall means are 2.70 for ln(wage) and 5.23 for ln(hours).  
Overall standard deviations are 0.42 for ln(wage) and 0.19 for ln(hours).  Correlation between 
long-term wage and hours equals 0.15.  
 
TABLE 3 
Employment, separation, and finding rates by group 
(SIPP data) 
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Overall means are 92.9% for employment (7.1% for non-employment rate), 1.45% for separation 
rate, and 18.5% for finding rate. TABLE 4 
 Deviation from Overall Means in Long-term Wages and Hours by Group 
(Model simulations) 
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Overall standard deviations are 0.35 for ln(wage) and 0.15 for ln(hours).  Correlation between 





Employment, separation, and finding rates by group 
(Model simulations) 
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Low hours 
 
Employment:  83.8% 
 
Separations:  1.68% 
 





















Overall means are 92.3% for employment (7.7% for non-employment rate), 1.1% for separation 
rate, and 13.0% for finding rate. TABLE 6 
Relative business cycles in Employment by Group, Data compared to Model 
 




Low wage  High wage 
 SIPP  data 
 






































Coefficients are responses of (ln) employment rate to aggregated (ln) employment rate.  For the 
SIPP data, the employment rate is instrumented based on U.S. average weekly hours and the 
unemployment rate for men.  All monthly series are HP-filtered, with parameter of 900,000.  
SIPP data are seasonally adjusted.  The SIPP data reflect 223 monthly observations per group.  
Standard errors (Newey-West corrected) are in parentheses.  Statistics for the model are means 
across 100 simulations; standard deviations for the simulations are in parentheses. 
TABLE 7 
Business cycles in Hours and Employment by Group, Data compared to Model 
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Coefficients are responses of (ln) hours and (ln) employment rate to aggregated (ln) total hours 
(employment times hours).  For the SIPP data, total hours are instrumented based on U.S. average 
weekly hours and the unemployment rate for men.  All monthly series are HP-filtered, with 
parameter of 900,000.  SIPP data are seasonally adjusted.  The SIPP data reflect 223 monthly 
observations per group.  Standard errors (Newey-West corrected) are in parentheses.  Statistics 
for the model are means across 100 simulations; standard deviations for the simulations are in 
parentheses. TABLE 8 
Business cycles in Separation and Finding Rates, Data compared to Model   
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Coefficients are responses of separation rate (in percentage points) and finding rate (in percentage 
points) to aggregate (ln) total hours (employment times hours).  For the SIPP data, aggregate total 
hours are instrumented based on U.S. average weekly hours and the unemployment rate for men.  
All monthly series are HP-filtered, with parameter of 900,000.  SIPP data are seasonally adjusted.  
The SIPP data reflect 223 monthly observations per group.  Standard errors (Newey-West 
corrected) are in parentheses.  Statistics for model are means across 100 simulations; standard 
deviations for the simulations are in parentheses. TABLE 9 



























Coefficients are responses of aggregated (ln) hours and (ln) employment rate to aggregated (ln) 
total hours (employment times hours).  For the SIPP data, total hours are instrumented based on 
U.S. average weekly hours and the unemployment rate for men.  All monthly series are HP-
filtered, with parameter of 900,000.  SIPP data are seasonally adjusted. The SIPP data reflect 223 
monthly observations per group.  Standard errors (Newey-West corrected) are in parentheses.  
Statistics for model are means across 100 simulations; the standard deviations for the simulations 
































Coefficients are responses of (ln) separation rate and (ln) finding rate to the aggregated (ln) total 
hours.  For the SIPP data, total hours are instrumented based on U.S. average weekly hours and 
the unemployment rate for men.  All monthly series are HP-filtered, with parameter of 900,000.  
SIPP data are seasonally adjusted. The SIPP data reflect 223 monthly observations per group.  
Standard errors (Newey-West corrected) are in parentheses.  Statistics for model are means across 
100 simulations; the standard deviations for the simulations are in parentheses. TABLE A1 
Schooling by Wage and Hours Group (SIPP data) 
 
 Wage  Group 
Hours Group 
 





mean: 12.5 years 
 
 21.4%  < 12 yrs 
40.2%  =  12 yrs 










































mean: 37.2 years 
 
31.4% are 20-29 
51.3% are 30-50 























Overall statistics: Mean 38.1 years, 25.2% are 20-29, 58.9% are 30-50, 15.9% are 51-60. TABLE A3 
























Industries classified as cyclical are construction, manufacturing and transportation.  The overall 






Cyclical Statistics for Model:  Relative Standard Deviations for Ln(unemployment) and 









































For the model economy aggregated σu/σz equals 4.81 and ρuv equals ─0.44. 
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